Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 62 | Issue 5

Article 10

1-1-1987

Drug Testing of Government Employees and the
Fourth Amendment: The Need for a Reasonable
Suspicion Standard
John F. Lawlor

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
John F. Lawlor, Drug Testing of Government Employees and the Fourth Amendment: The Need for a Reasonable Suspicion Standard, 62
Notre Dame L. Rev. 1063 (1987).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol62/iss5/10

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.

NOTE

Drug Testing of Government Employees and

the Fourth Amendment: The Need for a
Reasonable Suspicion Standard
As concern over the abuse of illicit drugs spreads throughout the
country, 1 many businesses have responded to the problem by implementing employee drug testing programs. 2 Similarly, governmental
bodies have started programs designed to determine whether government employees use drugs in the workplace. Proponents of such testing
claim that by identifying drug users, government officials can prevent the
evils of drug use from spreading into the government workplace, and
3
thus enable the government to carry out its duties more effectively.
With this reasoning in mind, the Reagan Administration proposed the
"Drug-Free America Act of 1986" which included the "Drug-Free Federal Workplace Act of 1986" as one of its titles. 4 The "Drug-Free Federal Workplace Act" would require most federal workers to undergo
drug testing. 5
Some courts, however, view drug testing as a violation of the delicate
privacy interests of tested individuals because the testing subjects those6
individuals to highly intrusive scrutiny of personal medical information.
Some argue that urine
tests are particularly embarrassing and degrading
7
to the person tested.
In a government employee drug testing situation, the provision of
the fourth amendment prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures
protects a tested employee. This note explores this constitutional protection and examines the individual and governmental interests at stake
in employee drug testing.8 Part I examines the motivations behind gov1 See America's Crusade: What is Behind the Latest War on Drugs, TME, Sept. 15, 1986, at 60 ("Opinion polls show that drug abuse has surpassed economic woes and the threat of real war as the nation's No. 1 concern.").
2 See O'Boyle, More Firms Require Employee Drug Tests, Wall St. J., August 8, 1985, at 6, col. 1.
3 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,564, 51 Fed. Reg. 32,889 (1986) (drug testing procedures implemented in federal executive branch to reflect the government's concern with "the well-being of its
employees, the successful accomplishment of agency missions, and the need to maintain employee
productivity").
4 See President's Message to Congress Transmitting "Drug-Free America Act of 1986," 22
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1192 (Sept. 15, 1986). See also Exec. Order No. 12,564, supra note 3
(mandatory drug testing for employees in sensitive positions in executive agencies).
5 See "Drug-Free Federal Workplace Act of 1986," reprintedin President's Message to Congress
Transmitting "Drug-Free America Act of 1986," supra note 4.
6 See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
7 See inf'a notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
8 The body of this note will not deal with the issue of employee consent to drug testing by a
government employer. Consent freely and voluntarily given precludes fourth amendment inquiry
into an intrusion. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973).
An employer may make consent to future drug testing a condition to continued employment,
subject to collective bargaining agreements. See Rothstein, Screenhig Ilorkers for Drugs: .4 Legal and
Ethical Framework, II EMP. REL. L.J. 422, 428 (1985). However, as the district court in McDonell v.
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ernment-sponsored drug testing. Part II determines whether government drug testing must comply with the fourth amendment.9 Part III
examines several of the standards that courts have used when determining whether drug testing violates government employees' fourth amendment rights. Part IV compares drug testing of government employees to
other searches that require reasonable suspicion. Part V concludes that
employee drug testing is constitutional only if a reasonable suspicion of
drug use exists before such testing occurs.
I.

Reasons for Employee Drug Testing

A government employer has several undeniably strong interests in
implementing drug testing programs for its employees. In any employment context, drug use can cause severe problems, including actual impairment caused by on-the-job intoxication or pathological behavior that
can adversely affect an employee's ability to do his job.' 0 Drug use may
decrease productivity, increase absenteeism, and cause accidents for
which the employer may be liable." Economic consequences of drug use
for an employer may include increased health insurance and workers'
compensation costs, training new workers to replace drug-dependent
12
employees, employee theft, and decreased quality control.
Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. Iowa 1985), modified, 808 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987) pointed out:
"Public employees cannot be bound by unreasonable conditions of employment. Advance consent
to future unreasonable searches is not a reasonable condition of employment." Id. at 1131 (citation
omitted). A commentator has noted:
The mere fact that [a public] employee signs a form in which he purports to acquiesce to a
urine test... will not automatically legitimatize any ensuing test .... At best, the existence
of such consent will likely be but one of many factors considered by a court in determining
the overall 'reasonableness' of a urine testing policy.
Bible, Screening ll'orkersfor Drugs: The ConstitutionalImplications of Urine Testing in Public Employment, 24
AM. Bus. L.J. 309, 340 (1986).
9 The fourth amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

Additionally, the Supreme Court has held the fourth amendment applicable to the actions of
state government through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
10 See Battling the Enemy Within: Companies Fight to Drive Illegal Drugs Out of the Workplace, TIME,
March 17, 1986, at 52.
Pathological behavior patterns stem from substance abuse disorders, and can cause an employee
to lose the capacity to function in his occupation. Erratic behavior may result, and physiological
dependence on the drug may set in. See G. UELMAN & V. HADDOX, DRUG ABUSE AND THE LAW
SOURCEBOOK 1-8 (1986).

11 See Geidt, Drug and Alcohol Abuse in the Work Place: Balancing Employer and Employee Rights, I1
EMp. REL. L.J. 181, 190-91 (1985); Husband, Drug andAlcoholAbuse in the Mo'0rkplace, 15 COLO. LAW. 31
(1986).
12 See Geidt, supra note 11; Husband, supra note 11, at 31. See also Susser, Legal Issues Raised by
Drugs in the Mlorkplace, 36 LAB. L.J. 42 (1985).
For the individual business, at least four types of worker behavior can be identified as creating drug problems for the employer. These include: drug intoxication on the job (arriving
at work under the influence of drugs or ingesting drugs during the workday); possession,
buying, and selling drugs in the workplace; poor job performance resulting from a drug use
or dependency problem; and employee thefts undertaken to support a drug habit.
Id. at 43.
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When an employee's duties help a government employer fulfill a
public obligation, employee misconduct due to drug use may cause the
government to breach its obligation to the community.' 3 Drug use by
government employees may endanger public safety. 14 Government employees such as firefighters and policemen perform functions that are so
essential to a community that the consequences of drug abuse by such
employees might prove disastrous. 15 For these reasons, drug testing for
the purposes of identifying, disciplining, or firing a government employee whose drug use could have a deleterious effect on job performance serves a valid public interest.
Apparently, the government has instituted employee testing in part
because of its stance on drug use in general. For various political' 6 and
sociological 17 reasons, federal, state and local governments have long attacked drug use in society. For these reasons, currently enacted drug
testing legislation rightly may be seen as part of a government's overall
drug policy. The frequent media exposure of government drug testing
programs, often initiated by the very government agents who implement
the programs, demonstrates the volatile political character of employee
drug testing.' 8
Governments have frequently included employee testing plans as
part of an overall plan to combat the abuse of illegal drugs in society.
Proponents describe government workplace testing as a means of creating an exemplary drug-free employment setting that the nation's private
13 See infra note 103 and accompanying text.
14 See Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.NJ. 1986) (firefighters); Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005 (D.C. 1985) (police officers); City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475
So. 2d 1322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (firefighters and police officers).
15 See Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1515 (The city employer is responsible "for ensuring that its
firefighting force is fully capable of protecting the welfare and public safety of Plainfield's citizenry."); Bauman, 475 So. 2d at 1326 ("The nature of a police officer's or fire fighter's duties involves so much potential danger to both the employee and to the general public as to give the City
legitimate concern that these employees not use controlled substances.").
See also Division 241 Amal. Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir.) (bus driver), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976); Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Tenn. 1986)
(firefighters);Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500, 1507 (D.D.C. 1986) ("obvious and special danger" posed by school bus drivers who use drugs); McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. Iowa
1985) (prison guards), modified, 808 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987); Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp.
482 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (city electrical workers).
Cf infra note 88. In Turner, 500 A.2d 1005, the court ruled that the type ofjob held by a government employee may reduce the legitimate expectation of privacy of that employee. For example, a
policeman would have a lesser expectation of privacy than a desk clerk.
16 Drug use has long been grist for the political mill. As a recent example, President Reagan,
Secretary of Transportation Elizabeth Dole, and Attorney General Edwin Meese have advocated
drug testing for the nation's airline pilots, train engineers, and federal employees. See, e.g., Pagano,
US. Will Require Random Drug Testsfor Flight Crews, Los Angeles Times, January 22, 1987, at 1, col. 5;
Stuart, Amtrak Crash Spurs Call for Random Drug Tests, N.Y. Times, January 22, 1987, at A22, col. 1;
Pear, Testing Plan Indicates Reagan 's "Outrage" Over Drug Abuse, N.Y. Times, December 7. 1986, § 4. at
4, col. 1.
17 See Gusfield, On Legislating Morals: The Symbolic Process of DesignatingDeviance. 56 CAL. L. REv.
54 (1968). Professor Gusfield argues that designating drug addicts as criminals operates as a "symbolic" function of the law-a public expression of disapproval-instead of fulfilling the "instrumental" function ofeffectively controlling drug use and abuse. Establishing drug use as deviant behavior
is a means of "designating the content of public morality." Id. at 57. The legislative process of
condemning drug use is thus seen as an effort to have the law reflect a "public affirmation of social
ideals and norms." Id.
18 See Capita, 643 F. Supp. at 1515.
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workplaces can emulate. 19 In addition to this governmental interest, the
President's Commission on Organized Crime recently advocated that
both government and private employers20test their employees for drugs in
order to help battle illegal drug traffic.
The government has substantial interests in both preventing employee drug use from impeding the fulfillment of its public duties and in
maintaining optimally safe conditions in the workplace and for the public
at large. However, the effect of instituting drug testing of government
employees as part of a plan to create an exemplary drug-free workplace
or to fight drug traffic is extremely attenuated. A plan to use drug tests
to combat drug traffic or to set an example for the nation's workplaces,
therefore, fulfills a lesser government interest than a plan to directly benefit either public safety or the employer's ability to discharge its statutory
2
responsibility. '
Even though the government has several strong interests in testing
its employees for drugs, several problems exist in doing so. Drug testing
severely compromises employee privacy. Courts have found drug testing
to be embarrassing 2 2 and even degrading. 23 Moreover, tests for most
illegal drugs not only detect recent drug use, but will also register a positive result for drug use even though the individual is no longer impaired. 24 Because public and workplace safety has been identified as the
primary goal of the government employer, 25 the gravest threat to safety
would seem to come from on-the-job impairment. Whether a government employer can discipline or fire employees who test positive on drug
tests but whose drug use may not have occurred while on the job and
27
may not have affected performance 26 is another issue facing the courts.
Because these problems exist, critics argue that the drug testing of gov19 When implementing a drug screening program in the United States Customs Service, the
Customs Commissioner wrote in a memo to the Service's employees that the program would "set an
important example in our country's struggle with this most serious threat to our national health and
security." Marcus, U.S. Drug Tests Challenged in Appeals Court, N.Y. Times, February 4, 1987, at D4,
col. 4. As part of his Administration's 1986 omnibus drug abuse legislation proposal, President
Reagan said the "Drug-Free Federal Workplace Act of 1986" would enable "the Federal government, as the Nation's largest employer, to set an example in ensuring a drug-free workplace." President's Message to Congress Transmitting "Drug-Free America Act of 1986," supra note 4. See also
Exec. Order No. 12,564, supra note 3 (requiring each executive agency to test employees in sensitive
positions for drugs).
20 See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME, AMERICA'S HABIT: DRUG ABUSE, DRUG
TRAFFICKING AND ORGANIZED CRIME (1986).
21 See Miller, Mandatory Urinalysis Testing and the Privacy Rights of Subject Employees: Toward a General
Rule of Legality Under the Fourth Amendment, 48 U. Pirr. L. REV. 201, 223 n.97 (1986).
22 Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1514.
23 National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, Civ. No. 86-3522 (E.D. La. 1986) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Newer file).
24 See hfra note 36 and accompanying text. See also American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726, 732 (S.D. Ga. 1986) ("[O]ne may be subject to the adverse consequences
of a positive test even where no 'intoxication' is involved.").
25 See Miller, supra note 21, at 217.
26 Cf. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1982)). The Act prohibits employment discrimination against handicapped
individuals who are able to perform theirjobs in a program receiving federal financial assistance or
tinder any program conducted by an executive agency or by the U.S. Postal Service. 29 U.S.C.
§ 794. See generally Rothstein, supra note 8,at 431-32. Alcoholics and drug abusers who do not, by
reason of their alcohol or drug abuse, "constitute a direct threat to the property or safety ofrothers."

NOTE

1987]

emnment employees
28
circumstances.
II.

should

be

implemented

only

in

extreme

Applicability of the Fourth Amendment to Employee Drug Testing
A.

Is Drug Testing Subject to FourthAmendment Scrutiny?

The fourth amendment protects people from unreasonable searches
and seizures undertaken by either federal or state governments. 29 The
United States Supreme Court has declared that the purpose of the fourth
amendment is to "safeguard the privacy and security of individuals
against arbitrary invasions by government officials." 3 0 The fundamental
inquiry to be asked when investigating potential violations of the fourth
amendment, according to the Court, is whether the search is
3
reasonable. '
Before a.court determines whether a particular invasion is reasonable, however, it must decide whether the invasion is within the scope of
fourth amendment regulation. Although the fourth amendment lists several areas to which it applies,3 2 the Supreme Court, in Katz v. United
States,3 3 rejected a locus-oriented definition of the fourth amendment,
34
declaring that "the fourth amendment protects people, not places."
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz elaborated that the fourth
amendment governs intrusions 3into
situations where a person has a rea5
sonable expectation of privacy.
Usually drug testing takes one of two primary forms-urine testing
or blood testing. Body fluids are seized and subjected to a series of tests
that seek to detect the presence of either an illegal drug or the body29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B), are defined as "handicapped" individuals by the Act. See Davis v. Bucher, 451
F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
Professor Rothstein sums up the concerns raised by the Act:
It is not clear whether an employer could refuse to hire or could discharge an employee
who was found to have drugs in his or her system but who had not indicated any difficulty in
performing job duties. The key question would appear to be related to the nature of the
job and whether the employer could demonstrate that the mere employment of the individual "would constitute a direct threat to property or the safety of others."
Rothstein, supra note 8, at 431-32.
27 See Palm Bay, 475 So. 2d at 1326 (A municipality can adopt a policy that prohibits police
officers and firefighters from using controlled substances "at any time while they are so employed,
whether such use is on or off the job.") (emphasis in original); Rothstein, supra note 8, at 424-25;
Note, Drug Testing' America's New Work Ethic?, 15 STETSON L. REV. 883, 898-901 (1986) (discussion of
Pal Bay holding). See also Comment, Dng Testing in the TWorkplace: A Legislative Proposal to Protect
Privacy, 13 J. LEGIs. 269, 279 (1986) ("If the employer can fire a person for smoking marijuana on
Saturday night, what prevents him from regulating such things as off-duty alcohol consumption or
even sleeping habits to ensure that the employee works to his full capacity?").
28 See American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, 651 F. Supp. at 735-36.
29 See supra note 9.
30 Camara v. Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
31 See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979) (essential purpose of fourth amendment is to impose a standard of reasonableness upon the exercise of discretion by government officials); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
32 See supra note 9 ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects .... ").
33 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
34 Id. at 351.
35 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). See also California v. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. 1809 (1986);
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1. 7 (1976).
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produced metabolites of that drug.3 6 Most courts have held that blood
and urine testing must satisfy the fourth amendment's requirement of
reasonableness to be constitutionally permissible. 37 In Schmerber v. California,38 the Supreme Court held that the governmental taking of a blood
sample from an arrested suspect was within "the constraints of the fourth

amendment." 3 9 Although urine collection does not involve penetration
of body walls, as does blood testing, at least one court has found urine
testing to be indistinguishable from blood tests because it involves "the
involuntary extraction of bodily fluids."

40

Some courts have held that in order for the fourth amendment to
protect an individual undergoing drug testing, that person must possess
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the fluids tested. 41 Under this line

of reasoning, certain seizures of blood or urine might not have to comply
with the fourth amendment. For example, some courts have found that
military personnel and prisoners have limited expectations of privacy in
their urine, thus making a "search" of such urine reasonable under the
2
fourth amendment.

4

Courts, however, have never found that a person has no legitimate
expectation of privacy in either his blood or urine. 4 3 This position is
consistent with the Supreme Court's rulings on other governmental invasions into other personal characteristics. The Court has maintained that
the fourth amendment will not apply to inspections of certain physical
characteristics, such as fingerprints, that are "constantly exposed to the
36 Drug metabolites are by-products of the body breaking down the intoxicating element of a
drug. Although the drug's intoxicant may only be present in the system for a short time, the metabolites to that intoxicant may linger for a greater period of time. Thus, a test may register a positive
result based upon the presence of drug metabolites in the body, when the intoxicating agent of the
drug is gone. See Marks, hninnoassays in Pharnnacology and Toxicology, in IMMUNOASSAYS FOR THE 80s
272 (1981).
37 For government employment cases so holding, see McDonell v. Hunter, 808 F.2d 1302 (8th
Cir. 1987); Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 577 (1986); Division
241 Amal. Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir. 1976); National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab, civ. no. 86-3522 (E.D. La. 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Newer file); American
Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726 (S.D. Ga. 1986); Mack v. United States,
No. 86 Civ. 5764 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Newer file); Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Tenn. 1986); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J.
1986);Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500 (D.D.C. 1986); Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp.
482 (N.D. Ga.1985); Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005 (D.C. 1985); City of Palm
Bay v. Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Patchogue-Medford Cong. of Teachers v.
Board of Educ., 119 A.D.2d 35, 505 N.Y.S.2d 888 (App. Div. 1986).
38 384 U.S. 757, 766-72 (1966).
39 Id. at 767.
40 Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp. 1214, 1218 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (drug test of prisoner).
41 See I'on Raab, Civ. No. 86-3522 (E.D. La. 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Newer file) (treasury
employees); Capna, 643 F. Supp. at 1513 (firefighters);Jones, 628 F. Supp. at 1508-09 (school bus
attendant); IcDonell, 612 F. Supp. at 1127 (prison guard); Palchogue-Medford Cong. of Tearlms. 119
A.D.2d 35, 505 N.Y.S.2d 888 (teachers).
42 See, e.g., Storms, 600 F. Supp. 1214 (drug testing of prisoners); Committee for GI Rights v.
Callaway, 518 F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (army warrantless drug tests and inspections reasonable).
Bat see Tucker v. Dickey, 613 F. Supp. 1124 (D. Wis. 1985) (drug tests in prison given for nonsecurity
purposes not accorded same level of deference as security-related drug tests).
For a perspective on drug testing in the military, see Abney. Drug.Abase. Coirs-.lMartial.and Rando Uirinalvsis-An Unworkable Comnbination, 27 ARIZ. L. REV I (1985).
43 Butsee Tinner, 500 A.2d at 1009 (NebekerJ., concurring) (argues that police officers have no
reasonable expectation of privacy in their urine for purposes of employee testing).
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public." 4 4 Unlike these characteristics, a person's blood and urine are
not subject to constant public scrutiny. Because urine is a physical characteristic not ordinarily open to the public eye, a person retains a legiti4 5 Urine tests thus fall within the
mate expectation of privacy in his urine.
46
purview of the fourth amendment.
Because the testing of blood and urine involves Schmerber-type situations and because people retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in
their blood and urine, employee drug testing constitutes a search governed by the fourth amendment. 4 7 While some government employees
may have a lesser expectation of privacy in their bodily fluids, this lesser
expectation affects the degree of fourth amendment protection, not the
existence of protection itself.
B.

Fourth Amendment Standardsfor Drug Testing

If an intrusion falls within the fourth amendment's scope of protection, it must be reasonable to be constitutional. Although the Supreme
Court has normally required a warrant 48 or a determination of probable
44 See Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 (1973) (finger printing, removal of dried blood sample
from under fingernails); United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973) (handwriting sample); United
States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973) (voice exemplar); United States v. Simmons, 569 F. Supp. 1155
(M.D. Tenn. 1983) (picture of defendant).
See generally American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, 651 F. Supp. at 733 (inherent intrusiveness of urine
testing is qualitatively different from the intrusion involved in the taking of fingerprints or of fingernails or hair clippings).
45 But see United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983). The Supreme Court in Place held that a test
so limited in scope that it revealed only the "presence or absence of ... contraband" was "less
intrusive than a typical search." Id. at 707. See also United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123
(1984) (A field test to determine solely whether a substance was contraband, and which discovered
"no other arguably 'private' fact, compromises no legitimate privacy interest."). A person has no
legitimate expectation of privacy in contraband.
Because the government takes possession of a surrendered blood or urine sample, the tests on
those samples are not as limited in scope as the warrantless intrusions upheld in Place (a canine sniff)
and in Jacobsen (a cocaine field test). Even if the government subjects the sample to a drug-specific
test that can only reveal whether contraband exists or not, no guarantee exists that the government
will not perform other tests on the surrendered sample. Further testing may tread upon the legitimate expectation of privacy of the subject by probing the other information contained in his body
fluids.
46 In Capua, 643 F. Supp. 1507, for example, the court identified a highly personal and reasonable expectation of privacy in the urine of firefighters subjected to random testing. The court recognized that testing can reveal "numerous physiological facts about the person from whom it came,
including but not limited to recent ingestion of drugs." Id. at 1513. The Capita court realized that
urinalysis could reveal information such as whether the person tested had epilepsy. Id. at 1515. See
also McDonell, 612 F. Supp. at 1127 ("One does not reasonably expect to discharge urine under
circumstances making it available to others to collect and analyze in order to discover the personal
physiological secrets it holds.").
47 See, e.g., Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1513 ("Though urine, unlike blood, is routinely discharged
from the body so that no actual intrusion is required for its collection, it is normally discharged and
disposed of under circumstances that merit protection from arbitrary interference.").
Most courts have held that employee drug testing constitutes a fourth amendment search. See
cases cited supra note 37.
48 When determining the reasonableness ofan intrusive governmental procedure, the Supreme
Court has ruled that "except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property
without proper consent is 'unreasonable' unless it has been authorized by a proper search warrant."
Camara, 387 U.S. at 528-29. See also Coolidge v. New Hampshire. 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971): Kat:.
389 U.S. at 356-57 ("searches conducted outside the judicial process. without prior approval by
judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the fourth amendment .... ).
A search warrant reflects a prior judicial determination of probable cause made by a neutral and
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cause to be executed prior to a search for that search to be declared reasonable, a class of cases has arisen in which searches do not require
either of these standards. 4 9 The courts judge the reasonableness of a
warrantless search in these cases by "balancing the need to search
against the invasion the search entails." 5 0
Some courts have upheld warrantless urinalysis on grounds that it
stands outside the warrant requirement and can be justified on a standard of suspicion less than probable cause. 5 1 Other courts uphold such
testing programs because the searches fit within exceptions to the warrant requirement; these exceptions are derived from the diminished expectation of privacy of either government employees or employees in
heavily regulated industries. 52 Yet, regardless of any exception to the
warrant requirement, these searches must also satisfy the reasonableness
balancing test.
1. The Intrusiveness of Drug Testing
Courts have disagreed on the level of personal intrusiveness inherent in a urinalysis. Some analogize the procedure to highly intrusive
strip searches or body cavity searches. 53 Other courts equate the intrusiveness of urinalysis to that of a blood test. 54 Still other courts find that

urinalysis is less intrusive than the taking of a blood sample. 55
detached magistrate. See W. LAFAVE &J. ISRAELS, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 3.3 to 3.4, at 109-10
(1986).
The Court has viewed a warrant as nearly indispensable, for it has viewed the process of obtaining a warrant as an effective safeguard, in and of itself, against arbitrary intrusions by the government. See, e.g., McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948). The Court has recognized
a number of situations where a search may be reasonable without a warrant or even a determination
of probable cause. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I(1968); Camara, 387 U.S. 523. Examples include
the stop-and-frisk and the various types of administrative and regulatory searches that the Court has
historically recognized. As the Court recently explained, "Although the underlying command of the
fourth amendment is always that searches be reasonable, what is reasonable depends on the context
within which a search takes place." New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985).
49 See infra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
50 Camara, 387 U.S. at 536-37.
51 See infra cases cited at note 77 & notes 96-108 and accompanying text.
52 See Turner, 500 A.2d 1005 (D.C. 1985); notes 109-28 infra and accompanying text.
Courts have long held that, consequent to accepting a government job, government employees
possess lesser constitutional rights in some respects than do other people. See hinra note 88 and
accompanying text. See generally D. ROSENBLOOM, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND LAw (1976).

One

court has ruled that the nature of government employment subsumes some of the fourth amendment protections of employees, at least in investigations that probe job-related misconduct. See iqfra
notes 96-108 and accompanying text. A government employer must comply with certain minimum
constitutional mandates in dealing with employees. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill,
470 U.S. 532 (1985) (employee due process rights examined in termination proceeding). The rights
of employees in these dealings, however, may be limited. The limited constitutional rights of government employees make it easier to justify drug testing in the employment context than it would be
to justify drug testing of people who are not government employees.
53 See, e.g., Tucker, 613 F. Supp. 1124 (drug test of prisoner); Storms, 600 F. Supp. 1214 (drug test
of prisoner).
54 See, e.g., Shoemaker, 795 F.2d 1136; Capua, 643 F. Supp. 1507.
55 See, e.g., McDonell v. Hunter, 808 F.2d 1302, 1308 (8th Cir. 1987); Al/e, 601 F. Supp. 482.
Sclimerber suggests that a medical procedure's risk, trauma, and pain are the relevant criteria for
judging its intrusiveness, and indicates further that societal acceptance of a particular test (e.g., a
blood test) may mitigate its invasiveness in terms of the fourth amendment. 384 U.S. at 771.
Whatever the level of intrusiveness of urinalysis, clearly the individual's surrender of a urine
sample implicates privacy interests different in kind from those brought to bear in the search of a
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Drug testing is intrusive for several reasons. By surrendering a
urine sample to government officials, a tested employee may unwittingly
reveal "private, personal medical information unrelated to the government's professed interest in discovering illegal drug abuse." 5 6 Drug testing also compels employees to engage in the highly personal act of
urination and may bring considerable stigma to the employee as news of
the drug testing is revealed to society. 57 In addition, those drug tests
taken at random imply a presumption of guilt that the tested employee
must overcome with a negative result.5 8 The unreliability of many drug
test results increases the invasiveness of drug testing 59 -an inaccurate
test reading or a test result that registers positive for "passive" or second-hand inhalation of contraband smoke may result in the unjust discipline or firing of an employee. 60 Aside from the intrusiveness inherent in
all drug testing, specific testing procedures themselves may further vio6
late the dignity of an employee. '
2.

The Government's Need to Search
The interests of the government must be sufficiently important to
counterbalance the invasiveness of drug testing. While governmental interests in a search may be important and compelling, 6 2 these interests do
not always justify all of'the testing programs that the government wishes
to implement. In fact, random drug testing, the type of testing that
would prove most effective in uncovering drug use in the government
workforce, 6 3 has been allowed only in isolated circumstances. 64 Efficacy
at fulfilling government objectives, without more, cannot justify any
home, business, or automobile. Consequently, drug testing should not be justified on rationales
borrowed from nonpersonal searches.
56 Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1515. See Comment, supra note 27, at 279 ("In addition to detecting

drugs ingested, [a urine sample] reveals the individual's medical history of such afflictions as venereal disease, epilepsy, and schizophrenia as well as his susceptibility to diseases such as heart attacks
and sickle cell anemia.") (footnote omitted).
57 See Marrotte, Drug Testing, 72 A.B.A. J. 20 (1986) (reviews holding in City of Palm Bay v.
Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985), and examines assertion that "tests could unjustifiably stigmatize an employee").
58 See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
59 See Miller, supra note 21, at 205-07.
60 Test results, especially of primary "screening" examinations (as distinct from more exact
"confirmatory" testing), may vary greatly in terms of reliability. A drug test may also register a
positive result for "passive" inhalation of marijuana when the subject does not actually smoke con-

traband, but is exposed to the smoke created by another who uses the drug. See Comment, supra
note 27, at 273-75; Comment, Admissibility of Biochemical Urinalysis Testing Results for the Pinpose of Detecting ,larijuana Use, 20 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 391, 392-98 (1984).
61 Some testing programs may be more intrusive than others. For example, several cases have
involved programs that include provisions for "direct observation" of the tested person as he or she
produces a urine sample. See, e.g., Lovvorn, 647 F. Supp. at 877; Capita, 643 F. Supp. at 1514. Some
programs may include a "pat-down" of the employee to guard against a "switched or adulterated
sample." Louvorn, 647 F. Supp. at 877. Ih an egregious example, a prisoner was forced to urinate
into a cup held by a guard. Storms, 600 F. Supp. at 1217.
In Lovvorn, the court recognized that the inquiry into intrusiveness was "subjective" and that the
degree of invasiveness might "vary greatly depending on the individual tested." 647 F. Supp. at 880.
However, the court concluded that "most people... have a certain subjective expectation of privacy
in the act of urination." Id.
62 See supra notes 10-28 and accompanying text.
63 Random testing very likely would uncover more drug use among employees than testing
based upon individualized suspicion. An employee using drugs might not manifest any of the visible
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search, much less a highly intrusive search such as urinalysis. 65
One court has recognized the danger of an "unfortunate precedent"
that might arise from decisions permitting random drug testing. 6 6 The
court observed that allowing random testing for drugs might lead to
other random medical examinations designed to reveal conditions that
might impair public safety. For example, employers might implement
random psychiatric examinations for reasons closely akin to those forwarded in support of drug testing.
III.

Specific Judicial Interpretations of the Fourth Amendment
and Employee Drug Tests
Courts have upheld the constitutionality of the government's warrantless drug testing of its employees or of private employees in heavily
regulated industries on three grounds. First, some courts have held that
a drug test will satisfy the requirements of the fourth amendment if it is
based on a standard of reasonable suspicion. 67 Second, other courts
have relied on an employee context exception to the warrant requirement. 68 Third, two federal circuits have found that random drug testing
of either employees in heavily regulated industries or of government employees in sensitive positions falls within an existing administrative
search exception. 69 Examining these rationales in light of the reasonableness balancing test reveals that drug testing should not proceed without some initial suspicion of drug use, even if the applicable standard for
suspicion falls below that of probable cause.
A. "Reasonable Suspicion": A Lesser Standard
Although the Constitution generally requires the government to
have probable cause before executing a search or seizure, some searches
occur upon a showing of less than probable cause and still are reasonable. Courts analyze these "inspections" and "administrative searches"
by somewhat different criteria than those searches and seizures that fulfill
purposes of traditional criminal investigation. "Administrative searches"
comprise an amorphous category for searches undertaken in response to
unique problems that the government cannot remedy using search tactics that comply with traditional fourth amendment strictures. 70 In these
effects of drug use in his demeanor or work habits. The employee's appearance thus would not give
an employer reasonable suspicion to search.
64 See Anmecan Fed'n of Gov'i Employees, 651 F. Supp. at 736 (declares random search of employees' urine impermissible under any but the most urgent of circumstances).
65 See McDonell, 612 F. Supp. at 1130.
66 American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, 651 F. Supp. at 736 (precedent allowing random testing
would have a far-reaching impact upon the rights of all citizens in areas outside the drug context).
67 See ira notes 70-95 and accompanying text.
68 See ifra notes 96-108 and accompanying text.
69 See ifra notes 109-28 and accompanying text.
70 Professors LaFave and Israels described the overall category of administrative searches in this
manner: "[I]t is generally assumed that the problems to which [administrative searches] are addressed could not be adequately dealt with under the usual fourth amendment restraints and that
consequently the practices must be judged by somewhat different standards." W. LAFAvE &J. IsRAELS, supra note 48, § 3.9 at 187.
See Camara v. Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. 523 (1967). To qualify as a search due different standards
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cases, a balancing of the government's justification for the search against
the extent of the invasion determines the search's reasonableness. 7' For
example, in Camara v. Municipal Court,7 2 the Supreme Court held that
valid housing inspection warrants could issue upon a showing that "reasonable legislative or administrative standards are satisfied for conT
ducting an area inspection with respect to a particular dwelling.""
Similarly, in Terry v. Ohio,74 the Court permitted brief, limited personal

seizures based upon less evidence than probable cause.
Administrative searches may be declared reasonable, therefore, if
they adhere to reasonable legislative or administrative standards (a
Camara situation), or if they are based on suspicion that, although not
amounting to the level of probable cause, is reasonable (a Terry
situation).75
Courts have consistently held that the urine testing of government
employees to protect public safety and welfare falls within the general
administrative search category. 76 Most of these courts have held that
searches falling within this general exception to normal fourth amendment standards must be based upon a standard of "reasonable suspicion."' 7 7 While a less demanding standard than probable cause, the
7
reasonable suspicion standard still requires individualized suspicion 8
than other fourth amendment intrusions, the Camaracourt cited three criteria: (1) whether the practice has a long history of judicial and public acceptance; (2) whether the practice is necessary to
achieve acceptable results; and (3) whether the practice involves a relatively limited invasion of privacy. Id. at 537.
Professors LaFave and Israels criticize this reasoning. They suggest that the Camara test would
be more effective to judge administrative search techniques if the holding were couched in terms of
two factors that supported the holding: (1) inability to accomplish an acceptable level of administrative enforcement within the traditional probable cause test; and, (2) the fact that the invasion was
based upon a relatively minor invasion of personal dignity and privacy. W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAELS,
supra note 48, § 3.9 at 190.
71 Camara, 387 U.S. at 536-37; W. LAFAVE &J. ISRAELS, supra note 48, § 3.9, at 187-202. See also
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 326 (1985).
72 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
73 Id. at 538.
74 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
75 See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307,
323 (1978); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1514 (D.N.J. 1986). See generally W.
LAFAVE &J. ISRAELS, supra note 48, § 3.9 at 188.
76 See Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1142 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 577 (1986);
Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985); cases cited ifra note 77.
77 See American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726 (S.D. Ga. 1986);
Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Tenn. 1986); Capia, 643 F. Supp. 1507;
Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500 (D.D.C. 1986); McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D.
Iowa 1985), modified, 808 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987); City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1322
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Patchogue-Medford Cong. of Teachers v. Board of Educ., 119 A.D.2d 35,
505 N.Y.S.2d 888 (App. Div. 1986). But see National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, Civ.
No. 86-3522 (E.D. La. 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Newer file) (probable cause required for employee urinalysis).
In Ten)y v. Ohio, the Supreme Court defined reasonable suspicion in this way: The searcher
"must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences
from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." 392 U.S. at 21 (footnote omitted).
78 See 7eny, 392 U.S. at 21 n.18.
In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976), the Court stated that "to accommodate public and private interests some quantum of individualized suspicion is usually required" to
execute a valid search. Id. at 560 (citation omitted). But, as the Court in .1Iarlitez-Fuertewas careful
to point out, "the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion." Id. at
561. For example, the Court's decision in Camara permitted "area" warrants without individualized
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that an employee uses drugs before he may be tested. Random testing of
employees clearly does not satisfy this standard.
The rationale applied to various types of administrative and regulatory procedures suffers from an imprecise definition of those searches to
which the standard applies. 7 9 However, when one applies the balancing
test provided by the Supreme Court in Camara80 and Terry 8 to the interests of the government and individual at stake in drug testing, it becomes
clear that drug testing indeed falls within those "rather special search
practices" 8 2 that comprise the administrative search category.
The Court has held that in certain settings "some easing of the restrictions" that normally regulate the ability of public authorities to
search may be necessary. 8 3 When recourse to the warrant requirement
would "unduly interfere" 8 4 with government interests, a warrantless
85
search may be permissible. The Court declared in New Jersey v. T.L.O.
that where "a careful balancing of governmental and private interests
suggests that the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment
standard of reasonableness that stops short of probable cause, we have
not hesitated to adopt such a standard."' 6
A balancing of interests demonstrates that requiring a governmental
employer to obtain a warrant or to have probable cause would unduly
frustrate the governmental need for the search. A government's need to
search is compelling in many circumstances.8 7 The government has a
strong interest in preventing any public harm that employee drug use
suspicion. 387 U.S. at 536. See also United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (warrantless search
of premises of gun dealer); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (warrantless search of premises of liquor seller).
However, drug testing of employees is distinguishable from those searches in which individualized suspicion is not required. The searches declared reasonable in Camara, Biswell, and Colonnade
did not involve searches of the person. Biswell and Colonnade involved situations where the searching
officers knew that the premises searched were used for the sale of liquor or guns, so it was logical
that evidence pertaining to those heavily regulated activities would be found there. See AlmeidaSanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 269-72 (1973). Drug testing of government employees involves, on the other hand, highly intrusive personal searches in situations where the testing officer
will often have no inclination whatever that evidence of drug use will be found.
79 See W. LAFAVE &J. ISRAELS, supra note 48, § 3.9 at 187.
Some of the practices, such as the examination of the effects of persons entering the country from abroad, have been followed for many years and have rather strong historical credentials, while others, such as the airport hijacker detention screening process, are rather
recent innovations undertaken in an effort to respond to new problems. However, they all
have this in common: it is generally assumed that the problems to which they are addressed
could not be adequately dealt with under the usual fourth amendment restraints and that
consequently the practices must be judged by somewhat different standards.
Id.
80 387 U.S. 523 (1967). See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text
81 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
82 W. LAFAVE &J. ISRAELS, supra note 48, § 3.9 at 187.
83 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985). T.L.O. involved a search of a student in a
public high school.
84 Id. See also Camara, 387 U.S. at 532-33 (A warrant is not required when "the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the government purpose behind the search.").
85 469 U.S. 325 (1985). See supra note 83.
86 Id. at 341.
87 The compelling interest of the government in having nonintoxicated policemen, firemen,
school bus drivers, and prison guards is manifest. For an employee in one of these sensitive positions to be impaired on the job could be calamitous to any community. See supra notes 10-20 and
accompanying text.
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might cause. On the other side of the balance are employee privacy interests that have been somewhat diminished by accepting government
employment.8 8 To require a search warrant or probable cause determination prior to any employee testing could harm the efficiency of the
government workplace without according reasonable additional protection to an employee's fourth amendment rights. Given the nature of
government employment, a warrant or probable cause determination
should not be required for drug testing of government employees.8 9
Although the balancing test indicates that neither a warrant nor
probable cause should be required, employee testing should not proceed
based upon a standard less than reasonable suspicion that a particular
employee uses drugs. The privacy rights of government employees demand that a quantum of individualized suspicion exist before testing may
commence. 90 The Supreme Court allowed the Camara intrusions into in88 See American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726, 736 (S.D. Ga. 1986)
("[I]t has generally been accepted that an employee does have a reasonable expectation of privacy
that is diminished in comparison with that reasonably held by members of the public at large."). See
generally Kelly v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 244-49 (1976) (state has greater latitude in regulating policemen's conduct than conduct of "citizenry at large").
In a recent Supreme Court decision, O'Connor v. Ortega, 107 S. Ct. 1492 (1987), a fourjustice
plurality appended an opinion to the judgment of the Court. O'Connor dealt with hospital officials
investigating the alleged improprieties of a doctor in charge of the hospital's residency program.
The plurality reasoned: "Individuals do not lose Fourth Amendment rights merely because they
work for the government instead of for a private employer. The operational realities of the workplace, however, may make some employees' expectations of privacy unreasonable when an intrusion
is by a supervisor rather than a law enforcement official." Id. at 1498. Although four justices dissented from the Court's judgment, the dissent agreed with the plurality on this point. Id. at 1508
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
It appears that the type of position a government employee holds may further limit his reasonable expectation of privacy. See Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005 (D.C. 1985)
(drug testing case; policemen analogized to military personnel who have a severely reduced reasonable expectation of privacy).
89 In O'Connor the plurality ruled that requiring a warrant or probable cause for either a
noninvestigatory work-related intrusion or an investigatory search for evidence of suspected employee misfeasance would impose "intolerable burdens" on public employers. 107 S. Ct. at 1502.
The plurality cited language in T.L. ., 469 U.S. 325, which suggested that "special needs" of the
government might make either a probable cause requirement or a warrant requirement impracticable. Id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring). .The plurality found that the government employer possessed "special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement" for both "legitimate workrelated, noninvestigatory intrusions as well as investigations ofwork-related misconduct." 107 S. Ct.
at 1502 (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351).
Three justices joined Justice Blackmun's dissent from the plurality opinion in O'Connor. Justice
Blackmun followed his concurring opinion in T.L.O. in reasoning that courts should apply the
Camarabalancing test only to those cases in which a "special" need was manifest. 107 S. Ct. at 151011 (Blackmun,J., concurring) (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S at 351). Justice Blackmun faulted the plurality for applying the Camara analysis without ascertaining this special need. 107 S. Ct. at 1511. The
dissent concluded that no special need existed in O'Connor that would justify the abandonment of the
probable cause or warrant requirements, and that the search, because it failed to comply with these
standards, was unreasonable. Id.
The plurality opinion stressed that it had no occasion to address the "proper Fourth Amendment standard for drug and alcohol testing of employees." Id. at 1504 n.**. Even so, the persuasive
value of this opinion to drug testing cases is probably very high, although the value of the separate
opinions is, in and of themselves, questionable due to the lack of a majority opinion. Although the
plurality and dissent disagree on several points, both opinions attempt to establish a standard to
regulate work-related searches of government employees. This standard would be, if clearly formulated, the applicable standard for medical screening of government employees.
90 Requiring a standard that demands a quantum of individualized suspicion places a limit on
the government's power to test, and can thus prevent entirely arbitrary testing. See T.L., 469 U.S.
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dividual homes pursuant to administrative standards devoid of individualized suspicion in part because the intrusions were nonpersonal and
because the invasions of privacy involved were "relatively limited." 9 1 In
contrast, warrantless testing of body fluids for the presence of drugs is
highly personal in nature and involves more than a relatively limited invasion of privacy.
The District Court of New Jersey applied the proper reasonable suspicion standard in Capua v. City of Plainfield9 2 after balancing the interests
of both employer and employee in drug testing. The court found that a
municipality needed to have a reasonable suspicion of drug use before it
could test 93its firefighters. Although the state's interest in testing was
"weighty,"
the court condemned random testing, finding that such a
procedure violated the constitutional guarantee against arbitrary governmental invasions by "essentially presum[ing] the guilt of each person
tested." 9 4 The court held that even the firefighters' diminished privacy
interests as public employees were entitled to protection from such a
grave intrusion. Furthermore, the court decided that the reasonable suspicion standard would not significantly impair the state's interest in testing its employees for drug use.9 5 In so doing, the court in Capua
recognized that a warrant or probable cause requirement would unduly
burden the state, and correctly settled on a reasonable suspicion
standard.
B.

The "Employment Context" Exception for Drug Testing

In Allen v. City of Marietta,96 the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia upheld the warrantless urinalyses of several government
employees on the ground that the searches fell within an exception to the
warrant requirement. 9 7 While the court found that government employees had "as much of a right to be free from warrantless government
searches as any other citizens," 98 it pointed out that "the government has
the same right as any private employer to oversee its employees and investigate potential misconduct relevant to the employee's performance
of his duties." 99 The court concluded that when the purpose of govern325; Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1517. See also Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654 (fourth amendment protects right
of personal security against arbitrary invasion by official power).
91 Camara, 387 U.S. at 537.
92 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986).
93 Id. at 1517.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 1519.
96 601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985). See also Note, ConstitutionalLaud--Urinalysis and the Public
Employer-Another ll'ell-DelineatedException to the Warrant Requirement?, 39 OKLA. L. REV. 257 (1986).
97 601 F. Supp. at 491.
98 Id.
99 Id. Although Allen refers to a general right of private employers to search employees while
investigating misconduct, this right is not clearly defined. See Deneberg, Remarks Before Conference on
Alcohol and Drug Abuse, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 220, at D-I (Nov. 14, 1983). Deneberg states:
Arbitrators . . . differ in their willingness to uphold an employee right to freedom from
unreasonable searches while at work. One arbitrator has declared in a substance abuse case
that 'there is no absolute right of an employer to search personal effects.' Another has
asserted that the constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures 'do
not shelter [an employee] from appropriate employer discipline.' Still others find a middle
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mental testing is not to investigate crime, but rather to ferret out employee misconduct that might impede job performance, "the employee
cannot really claim a legitimate expectation of privacy from searches of
that nature."1 0 0 Thus, because drug use might have impaired the government employees' performance of their duties in Allen, the warrantless
intrusion was deemed reasonable.
While under the facts in Allen reasonable suspicion probably existed
for the urinalysis, the court did not state explicitly that this quantum of
evidence was required for the search to be declared reasonable. The Allen
court placed only one limitation on the government employer's ability to
search employees-the search's purpose must be to investigate employee
misconduct "in a purely employment context." 10
' The court held that
the city had the right "to make warrantless searches of its employees for
the purpose of determining whether they are using or abusing drugs
which would affect their ability to perform safely their work .... ,,102
The Allen court based its holding on a "class of cases" that apparently confers a power on the government to search its employees without
a warrant in order to protect its ability to "discharge its statutory responsibility."' 0 3 The Allen opinion, however, does not cite any cases supporting a warrantless, suspicionless search of personal body fluids for
ground by drawing an analogy between the employer and a law enforcement officer; they
hold that an employer has the authority to search for contraband substances-but only
where the superior has probable cause to believe an 'industrial felony' has been committed.
Id.
See also Comco Metal Prods., Ltd., 58 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 279 (1972) (Brown, arb.) (no absolute
right exists for employer to search personal effects).
On a related point, it is difficult to see how a government employer can infringe on constitutional rights, even in the employment context, simply by equating the government to a private employer. See American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, 651 F. Supp. at 737 ("[I]t will be a dark day indeed when
the United States government finds it appropriate to abandon the strictures of the Constitution in
favor of a less burdensome 'private sector' set of rules that can allow for infringement of constitutional rights.").
100 601 F. Supp. at 491.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id. The court in Allen cited the following cases in support of its decision: United States v.
Sanders, 568 F.2d 1175 (5th Cir. 1978) (warrantless search of postal employee's locker); United
States v. Bunkers, 521 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 989 (1975); United States v.
Donato, 379 F.2d 288 (3d Cir. 1967) (warrantless search of United States Mint employee's locker);
United States v. Collins, 349 F.2d 863, 867 (2d Cir. 1965) (warrantless search of United States Customs Service employee's jacket as "it hung on a rack in his supervisor's office"), cert. denied, 383 U.S.
960 (1966); United States v. Grisby, 335 F.2d 652 (4th Cir. 1964) (warrantless search of marine's
living quarters on military reservation).
The Allen court found a distinction between the aforementioned permissible searches and other
warrantless impermissible searches of employees by their government employer. United States v.
Kahan, 350 F. Supp. 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 479 F.2d 290 (2d Cir. 1973),
rev'd, 415 U.S. 239 (1974); United States v. Hagarty, 388 F.2d 713 (7th Cir. 1968); United States v.
Blok, 188 F.2d 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1951). The distinction between permissible and impermissible warrantless searches of government employees depended on the government motivation for the search.
Government searches "to gather evidence of crime" from an employee could not proceed under the
employee context exception that Allen promulgated. A warrant was required or the search would
have to be justified under another exception to the warrant requirement. A legitimate employee
context search was limited to those searches "undertaken for the proprietary purpose of preventing
future damage to the agency's ability to discharge effectively its statutory responsibility." Allen, 601
F. Supp. at 491.
The distinction between criminal investigations and other investigations on which Allen based its
exception is muddled. As the court itself recognized, "governmental investigations of employee
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medical information. Such a search differs not only in the degree of intrusiveness from the types of intrusions cited in support, but also in kind.
For example, the cited cases involved the searches of personal effects left
in the workplace, 104 of the home of a marine on a military reservation,10 5
and of employee lockers in the government workplace.' 0 6 Searches of
body fluids touch on different notions of privacy than do these searches,
and turn up information that is markedly different from that revealed by
these invasions.
By not requiring some suspicion of drug use by individual employees prior to testing, the Allen court's exception to the warrant requirement is flawed. Under Allen, an employer has absolute discretion to
search any employee for drug use that would impair his ability to perform his work safely. The doctrine permits the unjustifiable result of
completely arbitrary searches within the employment context. The
Supreme Court has clearly preferred in other exceptions to the warrant
requirement that the discretion of government officials be narrowly channelled, 0 7 an objective that Allen's lack of standards does not
08
accomplish. 1
C.

Random Drug Tests of Government Employees and Employees
in Heavily Regulated Industries

Two Circuit Courts have permitted a governmental body to implement random testing plans in the workplace.
In Shoemaker v. Handel,i09 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit upheld a warrantless, random urinalysis program conducted by the NewJersey Racing Commission. 110 The program did not
require Commission officials to possess individualized suspicion of drug
use by any of the jockeys, trainers, and grooms who were to be tested.
The court held that the program fell within an exception to the warrant
requirement recognized for heavily regulated industries. The court
ruled that a drug testing program would fall within the exception based
upon two criteria: (1) if there was a strong state interest in an unannounced search, and (2) if the pervasive regulation of the industry had
reduced the legitimate expectation of privacy of the person searched."'
The court found that these requirements were satisfied in the extensively
regulated field of horse racing. Thus, the court concluded that the program of random testing conducted without initial suspicion of individual
misconduct always carry the potential to become criminal investigations." Id. See Note, supra note
96 (criticism of Allen's distinction and holding).
104 Collins, 349 F.2d 863.
105 Grisby, 335 F.2d 652.
106 Sanders, 568 F.2d 1175; Bunkers, 521 F.2d 1217; Donato, 379 F.2d 288.
107 See Prouse, 440 U.S. 648; Marshall, 436 U.S. 307.
108 Several courts, faced with fact situations similar to Allen, have not relied on Allen's blanket
exception. See Loz'vorn, 647 F. Supp. 875; Capia, 643 F. Supp. 1507; McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F.
Supp. 1122 (S.D. Iowa 1985), modified, 808 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987).
109 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 577 (1986).
110 Id.at 1143.
111 Id. at 1142.

1987]

1

NOTE

drug use was reasonable." 12
The Shoemaker court required no individual suspicion but insteadjustified the random urinalysis program in terms of an administrative
13
scheme that sufficiently limited the discretion of the testing officer."
Although administrative standards channelled the discretion of the testing officials, the Shoemaker doctrine is flawed. The court's contention that
pervasive regulation of the industry reduced the plaintiffs' expectation of
privacy defies logic. The court in Shoemaker derived its exception from a
warrant exception that permitted administrative searches of business
premises, 1 4 not of people. Even though a state's pervasive regulation of
horse racing may justify warrantless searches of various racing premises
pursuant to an administrative scheme, the search of an individual in that
industry is a different matter.' '5 Searches of persons are qualitatively different from searches of business premises. Arguably, people have a far
greater expectation of privacy in their bodily fluids than they do in their
business premises. Thus, if the pervasive regulation of the industry lowers a person's expectation of privacy in his bodily fluids at all, it does so
to a lesser extent than it reduces his expectation of privacy in his business
premises. The Shoemaker court mistakenly applied the administrative
search exception for business premises to the drug testing of individuals
in a highly regulated industry.
In McDonell v. Hunter, 1 6 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit upheld a warrantless random urinalysis conducted by the
Iowa Department of Corrections on certain correctional employees."1 7
The Circuit Court modified an order issued by the district court" 18 that
had required the Department of Corrections to have reasonable suspicion of drug use before ordering its prison guards to undergo drug test112 Id. at 1142-43. An additional concern of the court was that the discretion of the Racing Commission officials administering the test be sufficiently circumscribed. Id. See Marshall v. Barlow's,
Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
113 The names of all jockeys participating in a race were placed in an envelope. A state official
would draw three to five names of individuals who were then tested at the end of the racing day. The
state invited a member of the jockey's Guild to supervise the selection process. Ifa name was drawn
more than three times in a seven-day period, the fourth selection would be disregarded. The Racing
Commission could change the names- of those to be tested at the end of each day. Shoemaker, 795
F.2d at 1139-40.
See generally Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (fourth amendment requires that intrusions left to discretion of
officials in the field have limiting guidelines).
114 In support of its exception to the warrant requirement, the Shoemaker court cited Donovan v.
Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981) (inspection of coal mines); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972)
(premises of gun seller); and Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (premises of liquor seller).
For an overview of the administrative search exception applicable to business premises, see W.
LAFAVE &J. ISRAELS, supra note 48, § 3.9, at 190-92.
115 But see Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1142.
[W]hile there are distinctions between searches of persons and searches of premises, in the
intensely-regulated field of horse racing, where the persons engaged in the regulated activity are the principal regulatory concern, the distinctions are not so significant that warrantless testing for alcohol and drug use can be said to be constitutionally unreasonable.
Id.
116 808 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987), modi'fhig, 612 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. Iowa 1985).
117 Id. at 1304.
118 612 F. Supp. 1122.
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ing. 9 The Eighth Circuit balanced the intrusiveness of drug testing
against the state's interest in prison security.' 20 In so doing, the court
found that urinalysis was not as intrusive as a strip search or blood
22
test,' 2' that the state's interest in prison security was a central one,
and that what it felt to be a limited intrusion into the guards' legitimate
expectation of privacy was one "which society will accept as reasonable."' 23 After balancing the intrusiveness of the tests against the government's need to search, the court held that the state could implement a
program of uniform or random urinalysis on guards who had "regular
contact with prisoners
on a day-to-day basis in medium or maximum se24
curity prisons."
The McDonell holding lacks persuasive precedential value for two
reasons, however. First, the court heavily relied on its finding that urinalysis was not as intrusive as strip searches, 25 a procedure for which the
26
court required reasonable suspicion earlier in the McDonel opinion.
Because urinalysis is highly intrusive in its own right, however, it does
not follow that it is due a lesser standard of suspicion than strip searches
merely because it may be less intrusive than those extreme invasions.
Second, the court relied on the Third Circuit's opinion in Shoemaker,
which erroneously applied the administrative search exception for inspecting the business premises of heavily regulated industries to searches
of individuals in those industries. The court compared the Department
of Corrections testing program to the Racing Commission program upheld in Shoemaker, and stated that "the state's interest in safeguarding the
security of its correctional institutions is at least as strong as its interest
in safeguarding the integrity of, and the public confidence in, the horse
racing industry."' 12 7 Because the McDonell court relied on a distinction
between urinalysis and strip searches that largely ignored the inherent
intrusiveness of urinalysis, and because it relied on Shoemaker as a strong
precedent, its opinion lacks persuasive force. 128
119 Id. at 1130.
120 808 F.2d at 1308.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id. The court limited its holding by stating that "Urinalysis testing within the institution's
confines, other than uniformly or by systematic random selection of the employees so designated,
may be made only on the basis of reasonable suspicion .... Id. The court also pointed out that the
method of selection could not be arbitrary or discriminatory. Id.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 1306-07. See also Security and Law Enforcement Employees, District Council 82 v. Carey, 737 F.2d 187, 203-04 (2d Cir. 1984).
127 808 F.2d 1308. See Shoemaker, 795 F.2d 1136; supra notes 109-115 and accompanying text.
128 Moreover, in his separate opinion, Chief Judge Lay found that, by modifying the district
court's order, which had issued with the district judge as fact finder, the majority had engaged in "de
novo fact finding contrary both to Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) and to the Supreme Court's guidelines for
appellate review" which the Court had set forth in Anderson v. City of Bessemer City. 470 U.S. 564
(1985). 808 F.2d at 1311 (Lay, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Chief Judge Lay
pointed to several instances where the majority had disagreed with the district court's findings, and
argued that in relying on its own version of the facts of the case, the majority did not adhere to the
"clearly erroneous" standard mandated in Anderson. Id. at 1311-12.
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IV. The Need for a Reasonable Suspicion Standard
By comparing the interests at stake in drug testing to those interests
at stake in other types of searches that may be permitted based upon
reasonable suspicion, it can be seen that drug testing cannot proceed
under a lesser standard than reasonable suspicion. In Terry, 129 the
Supreme Court balanced the interest of a police officer in protecting
himself and others from harm against the nature of the "brief, though far
from inconsiderable, intrusion on the sanctity of the person" 3 0 posed by
a frisk. Because the officer had a reasonable suspicion that the person he
stopped was armed, the Terry Court concluded that a limited patdown
was constitutional.13 1 In Delaware v. Prouse,l3 2 the Court held that motorists could not be subjected to spot checks for license and registration
absent reasonable suspicion that either the motorist was unlicensed, that
the vehicle was unregistered, or that the vehicle or an occupant had violated the law. 13 3 This holding resulted from the Court's balancing of the
government's interest in highway safety against the invasiveness of the
search. In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,13 4 the Court required United
States Border Patrol roving patrols to have reasonable suspicion that a
car was carrying illegal aliens to justify a stop of that car for brief questioning of the occupants as to immigration status and citizenship. 3 5 The
Court balanced the invasiveness of the search against the government's
interest in stemming the flow of illegal aliens.
The interests of the government in conducting drug testing of its
employees are not greater than any of the governmental interests examined in Terry, Prouse, or Brignoni-Ponce. The degree of invasiveness of
drug testing on the tested individual, however, is much greater than the
level of invasiveness in any of the above situations. Consequently, government officials must possess reasonable suspicion of drug use before
they test their employees. Applying the Camara standard 3 6 compels the
conclusion that employee drug testing cannot be based upon administrative standards devoid of individualized suspicion.
V. Conclusion
Mandatory drug testing of government employees can aid the government employer in implementing the noteworthy goals of maintaining
workplace and public safety and can enable the government to better fulfill its statutory responsibility. Such tests, however, severely compromise
employee privacy. Drug testing is inherently intrusive because a surrendered urine sample may reveal personal information unrelated to drug
use. The tests also most commonly involve the private activity of urination, and may impose a damaging social stigma on an employee. In a
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136

392 U.S. 1. See supra notes 74 & 81 and accompanying text.
392 at 26.
Id. at 30-31.
440 U.S. 648 (1979).
Id. at 663.
422 U.S. 873 (1975).
Id. at 884.
See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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random testing situation, the tests effectively impart a presumption of
guilt upon the person tested. In addition, the specific test procedures
themselves may be especially intrusive or embarrassing.
Drug testing of government employees touches on privacy interests
far removed from those involved in administrative searches of business
premises and from those implicated in warrantless nonpersonal searches
of government employees. The costs of obtaining a warrant or making a
determination of probable cause may inconvenience a governmental employer in its attempt to eradicate the effects of drugs from the a workplace. However, absent some form of consent by contractual provision
or otherwise, some quantum of individualized suspicion should be required before the government can test its employees. Random testing
cannot be justified under constitutional principles.
John F. Lawlor
Addendum
In National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170
(5th Cir.), emergency stay denied, 107 S. Ct. 3182 (1987), the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated an order of the District Courtfor the
EasternDistrict of Louisiana which enjoined a warrantlessurinalysisprogram set up
by the United States Customs Service. The Fifth Circuitagreedwith the district court
that urinalysis was "a searchfor purposes of the fourth amendment," 816 F.2d at
176, but held that the warrantless drug tests proposed by the Customs Service were
reasonable even without a quantum of individualized suspicion. Id. at 180.
The court balanced "all of the factors suggesting constitutional violation
against all of those indicating validity, " id. at 177, and looked to criteriaforjudging the reasonablenessof medical invasions set out by the Supreme Court in Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979): The scope, manner,justification, andplace of the
intrusion. Id. at 559. The court also examined the possible voluntariness of the
search, the significance of the employment relationshipon the government's ability to
test its private citizen employees, the administrativenature of the search, the availability of less restrictive measures of accomplishing drug use screening of employees,
and the effectiveness of the tests. Additionally, the court analogized the expectation of
privacy of Customs Service employees to the diminishedexpectation ofprivacy of individuals in highly regulated industries. 816 F.2d at 178-80. After examining all
these points of inquiry, the court concluded that the Customs Service's program was
reasonableeven without reasonablesuspicion. "It is not unreasonableto set traps to
keep foxes from entering hen houses even in the absence of evidence of priorvulpine
intrusion or individualizedsuspicion that a particularfox has an appetitefor chickens." Id. at 179.
Following Von Raab, there are now three federal circuit court opinions that
permit drug tests of either government employees or employees in highly regulated
industry without any individualizedsuspicion that a particularemployee uses drugs.

